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Abstract
The mean voter theorem suggests that all parties should rationally con-
verge to the electoral center. Typically this leads to an outcome which is
unattractive to the rich. This paper develops a general stochastic model of
elections in which the electoral response is a⁄ected by the valence (or qual-
ity) of the candidates. Contributions made by policy-motivated activists can
in￿ uence valence, leading to the failure of the mean voter theorem. The
model is then applied to the presidential elections in 1989 and 1995 in Ar-
gentina, to suggest why Carlos Menem, who won in 1989 with a populist
platform, was able to win in 1995 with quite di⁄erent policies that favored
the upper middle class.
￿This paper is based on work supported by NSF grant 0715929, and was completed
while Scho￿eld was research fellow at ICER, Turin.
11 Introduction
It has often been remarked that Latin America polities seem to swing in a ran-
dom fashion between pro-market and anti-market democracies (Dominguez,
1998). When democracy returned to Latin America, in the 1980s, the gov-
ernments in Argentina and Brazil resisted the so-called ￿market-oriented re-
forms￿ . However, later, in the 1990s, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay,
Chile and Peru all implemented fundamental economic reforms. The pen-
dulum has swung again, and there is a move to the left (Castaneda 2006
and Vargas Llosa 2005). Because the literature generally provides only de-
scriptive analysis, two important questions remain unanswered. First, what
rationale explains a country￿ s swing from left to right and back again? Sec-
ond, is there some mechanism that causes swings in one country to infect its
neighbours?
While these questions have an obvious intrinsic interest, they also pose a
theoretical challenge for formal models of electoral competition.
Consider the ￿rst question about one country￿ s oscilation between left and
right. Such a phenomenon is very di¢ cult to obtain using the standard model
of political competition, principally because non-centrist policy platforms will
generally not be in equilibrium, according to this model. Even if this problem
is dealt with, it would still be necessary to relate the oscillations to changes
in exogenous parameters. The only obvious way would be to assume that
the electoral preferences or the institutional rules change radically for some
2unexplained exogenous reason. In this paper, we o⁄er a model that provides
an endogenous reason for the afore-mentioned oscillations. Moreover, the
case study presented here makes clear that the cause of this oscillation is not
directly due to a change in electoral preferences.
Stokes (2001) suggests that policy switches are the result of politicians
attempting to implement policies that they know are unpopular, they which
they think are best for the general good.. This argument could be plausible
in the the case, for Latin American polities, since the voters may greatly
underestimate the relative e⁄ectiveness of market competition over state-
intervention policies. However, there would seem to be two premises that are
imbedded in this argument by Stokes:
(i) the assumption that voters are uncertain about the e⁄ect of policies
on their welfare, and
(ii) the assumption that there is a prevalent single dimension in the polity,
along which the voters have a common interest.1.
Neither of these are particularly compelling.
Moreover, previous work (Scho￿eld and Cataife, 2007) suggests that the
understanding of Latin American polities may require (i) dealing with more
than one policy dimension, and (ii) taking into account the heterogeneity of
interests within the polity. Indeed, the work points out the importance of
currency as a second policy-dimension, and focuses on the winners and losers
created by speci￿c policy positions on the currency dimension.
1See Harrington 1993 for a model based on similar premises.
3To the best of our knowledge, the second question about the contagion
mechanism operating across the region has not even been addressed in any
formal model. Indeed, almost by de￿nition, the standard spatial model is
usually constructed with reference to a single polity, and is thus ill-equipped
to deal with matters such as contagion.
Rather than discussing these questions abstractly, we consider the case of
the Argentinean elections of 1989, 1995 and 1999. The study of a particular
polity allows us to provide a better motivatation for the analysis as well as an
evaluation of the empirical implications of our model. We study Argentina
rather than one of the other polities in the region because the sequence
of events in Argentina shows that the causal connection is from political
strategies to voter preferences rather than from preferences to strategies, as
is usual in formal models. Indeed, the analysis of the Argentinean elections
of 1989 and 1995 suggests that political candidates do not simply respond
to the wishes of the electorate. Instead, the incentives of the candidates
themselves induce the oscillation between winning policies.
In the next two sections of the paper we give an account of these elec-
tions and their e⁄ects together with a suggestion about the role played by
international ￿nancial institutions, as well as the US government. Section
4 presents an outline of the formal model (based on Scho￿eld and Cataife,
2007), together with the reason why a simple one dimensional model is in-
adequate to explain this oscillation between left and right. Secton 5 gives a
brief conclusion.
42 Argentina 1989: From Populist Promises to
Neoliberal Policies
In 1989, Carlos Menem, the candidate of the PJ (Partido Justicialista), was
elected President of Argentina with almost 50% of the votes. Menem￿ s pop-
ulist platform, which included a universal rise in salaries (salariazo) and a
big push to the productive sector (revolucion productiva), was supported by
the working class, and was the key to Menem￿ s electoral victory. In contrast,
the middle and upper class generally supported the historical rival of the PJ,
namely the UCR (Union Civica Radical).
The Argentinean upper middle class probably regarded Menem as a dem-
agogue from the countryside. From their perspective, Menem lacked both the
values and the skills to lead a country that had su⁄ered under a harsh mil-
itary dictatorship (1976-1983) followed by an incompetent democratic gov-
ernment (1983-1989) whose economic mismanagement had brought about
hyperin￿ ation. It was believed that Menem￿ s electoral promises, if imple-
mented, would lead to a highly redistributive policy, with a strengthening of
the labour unions and a weakening of private property.
Surprisingly, once in o¢ ce Menem implemented policies that were oppo-
site to his electoral promises. The new policies included the liberalization
of trade and the labor market, and the privatization of several state compa-
nies.. More importantly, in 1991, Menem established a currency board that
pegged the Argentinean peso to the dollar, by legally forcing the Central
5Bank to hold dollar reserves to cover its Argentinean peso liabilities in a 1-
to-1 ratio. Although this policy (soon known as the ￿Convertibility Plan￿ )
succeeded in controlling in￿ ation, it led to three major problems. First, the
￿nancial system became very fragile, since the Central Bank lost its role of
lender of last resort for the economy. Second, the government sacri￿ced its
control over the real exchange rate. Third, the resulting monetary policy
was not accompanied by any measure of ￿scal discipline. This was because
the discretionary allocation of ￿scal resources by the federal government in
Argentina was crucial for the manipulation of political and electoral support
at the local level. These problems made the economy especially vulnerable
to exogenous shocks, particularly those resulting from ￿contagion￿from the
international economy.
2.1 The Two Periods of the Convertibility Plan
As long as the value of the dollar did not appreciate with respect to Ar-
gentina￿ s major commercial partners, and the government was able to ￿nance
itself either through foreign debt or counter cyclical funds, the economic plan
succeed in providing the stability required for economic growth. Indeed, the
absence of exogenous shocks in the period 1991-1995 provided Argentina with
high rates of economic growth (over 8% on average between 1991 and 1994)
and a widespread optimism both at home and among foreign investors.
As soon as the international conditions changed, Argentina￿ s vulnerabil-
ity to external shocks proved to be very high. The principal shocks were
6the Tequila crisis in 1995, the East Asian crisis in 1997, the devaluation of
the Brazilian real in 1998 and the appreciation of the dollar relative to the
European currencies after 1995. An analysis of the consequences of each par-
ticular crisis on Argentina is beyond the scope of this article. It is enough
to say that although the Convertibility Plan survived all these shocks, the
cumulative e⁄ect was to make Argentina￿ s economic scheme unsustainable.
The Argentinean peso appreciated by 25% in real terms between 1990
and 1998 (the appreciation reached 32% by 2000), making Argentina an
expensive country even by European and U.S. standards. Given that the
Convertibility Plan outlawed the printing of money without dollar backing,
the ￿scal imbalances in Argentinean currency had to be ￿nanced through
foreign debt. In addition, the appreciation of the currency magni￿ed the
levels of debt when denominated in dollars. Consequently, between 1991 and
2001, the public debt increased from U.S. $87 billion to U.S. $145 billion.
Thus, the Convertibility Plan succeeded in controlling hyperin￿ ation, but
when the external conditions became unfavorable, it forced the government
to replace monetary laxity with foreign debt. Of course, this strategy paid-o⁄
from an electoral point of view, at least as long as the government managed
to re￿nance the short-term debt.
Argentina￿ s economic performance over the 1990￿ s could be said to have
two di⁄erent periods. The period 1991-1995 was characterized by sustain-
able ￿scal de￿cits, high economic growth and a reasonable (although perhaps
not competitive) real exchange rate. In contrast, the period 1995-2001 was
7characterized by a much lower economic growth (indeed with economy con-
traction in 1995, 1999, 2000 and 2001), high unemployment rates, large ￿scal
imbalances and an increasing foreign debt. All of these were the product
of the in￿ exibility of Argentina￿ s economy. In retrospect, it seems clear that
sooner or later a severe enough external shock would occur, forcing a political
decision to abandon the Convertibility Plan and to allow the market to re-
establish some sort of equilibrium. The longer the exchange rate correction
was postponed, the greater the private and public sector dollar-denominated
loans. In sum, postponing a devaluation would only increase the probability
of default and bankruptcy of both sectors. It is hard to see, then, how the
merits of the Convertibility Plan in 1991-1994 could be dissociated from its
costs in 1995-2001. The seeds of the crisis of 2001 were already present in
the early apparent success of the Plan.
2.2 Losers and Winners
We can easily determine who were the domestic winners and losers over the
ten year cycle of the Plan.
Carlos Menem and his entourage were in o¢ ce for these ten years. In this
period, Menem managed to control a plurality in both chambers of Congress.
By increasing the Supreme Court of Justice ￿ve to nine, and by maneuver-
ing these appointments, he also obtained an ￿automatic majority￿ in the
Court. This maneuver could guarantee immunity from later accusations of
corruption over the U.S. $20 billion federal fund collected from privatizations.
8In order to increase the real value of assets and pro￿ts, it was in the
interest of the foreign companies hoping to acquire publicly owned companies
that Argentina maintain an appreciated currency. Because the interests of
the corrupt politicians were aligned with those of the foreign companies, they
also wanted Argentina to stick to the Convertibility Plan.
The Argentinean upper-middle class also bene￿ted from the economic
scheme. After years of complete absence of credit (a consequence of a high-
in￿ ation and closed economy), the Convertibility Plan brought about a con-
sumption boom of imported goods. Argentineans could be found among
Japanese, European and American tourists traveling around the world. The
political elite in o¢ ce was perceived by the upper-middle class citizens to
be corrupt itself and to condone corruption at all levels of government. Al-
though this corruption violated the ethical standards that might have been
dominant earlier, the bene￿ts associated with the new consumption habits
proved to be irresistible. In 1995, Menem was re-elected with a percentage
of the votes similar to 1989. Although he lost 10% of the left votes to a new
party, FREPASO (Frente Pais Solidario), he gained 10% of the center-right
votes.
Despite their initial aversion, the upper-middle class felt more than satis-
￿ed with Menem￿ s government. Indeed, Menem￿ s policies created an excellent
business environment, starting with economic stability and a regressive tax
structure. Indeed, members of this class also became business partners in
Argentina￿ s modernization and infrastructure projects.
9For the working class, the real wage remained practically unchanged from
1990 to 2000. On average, the unions had organized one general strike (across
the di⁄erent industrial sectors) every six months during the presidency of
Raul Alfonsin of the UCR. Menem, Alfonsin￿ s successor, avoided this problem
by giving the union leaders control over the resources of the health plans of
their respective industrial sectors. As a result, Menem only faced one general
strike on average every ￿fteen months.
As a consequence of the Convertibility Plan, the per-capita public debt
increased by U.S. $1750 in 1991-2001. This money would eventually have
to be paid through taxes by the citizens. Any devaluation would make the
burden of the foreign debt even heavier. Eventually Argentina defaulted
on part of its debt (although not its debt with the international ￿nancial
organizations). Two points need to be considered. First, the default was the
product of the circumstances, not a plan devised ahead of time. Second, the
country did have to pay the costs of the devaluation and default, and the
ensuing crisis may well be considered the most profound that the country
has had to face in recent history.
At least theoretically, the upper middle class was able to insure against
the damages of an eventual devaluation, by saving in dollars and sending
their money out of the country. Of course, although this strategy was in
principle available to everyone, the working class was unable to use it. They
received meager bene￿t from the consumption boom, and had to face the full
consequences of the per-capita increase in the public external debt.
103 The Role of the IMF and the U.S. govern-
ment
Cavuto: What￿ s the advice here? I mean does the United States stand
by a strong dollar? That must be the consistent policy, but it￿ s never con-
sistently said.
Brady:2 But I think you￿ ve fallen into the trap, Neil, if I can say. It￿ s
not strong or weak. It￿ s lower or higher against other currencies, and, if it is
the largest reserve currency in the world, if it￿ s the highest held currency by
all central banks, it￿ s got to be...
Cavuto: Yes, but it￿ s not the most happening currency right now.
Brady: Now you￿ re right. It is the largest one in reserves and all that.
The euro has been gaining a considerable amount of steam. It￿ s back to
levels when it ￿rst started a few years ago.
Cavuto: Many are saying that the dollar￿ s days as the premier currency
maybe a decade from now could be numbered.
What do you think?
Brady: I don￿ t think so. I think if the country￿ s strong, the dollar will
be strong, too. It will ￿ uctuate some, and the people that have the most to
do with it are the central bankers in the world.3
Domingo Cavallo, Argentina￿ s Economy Minister in 1991-1996, and ar-
chitect of the Convertibility Plan, has stated (Cavallo (2004) that although
some of the policies implemented by Menem and himself were aligned with the
2Nicholas F. Brady was U.S. Treasury Secretary in 1991, when Argentina implemented
the Convertibility Plan.
3Partial transcript from Your World with Neil Cavuto, Fox News June 5, 2003.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,88801,00.html
11so-called Washington Consensus (namely privatization, trade liberalization
and deregulation), other recommendations of the Consensus (￿scal discipline,
a competitive exchange rate, and tax reforms) were not. Cavallo mentions
that, in the beginning, the technical sta⁄of the IMF did not support Menem￿ s
package of policies, because they were not fully aligned with the Consensus.
Nonetheless, adds Cavallo, the intermediation of Clinton￿ s administration in
favor of the Argentinean government induced the endorsement of the IMF.
In other words, the initial support of the IMF for the Convertibility Plan was
not due to the technical recommendation of the sta⁄, but to pressure from
the U.S. government. Later on in the 1990￿ s, the IMF repeatedly supported
Argentina￿ s economic reforms and, in particular, asserted that Argentina￿ s
currency board was an example of a credible and viable regime. In the
words of the Independent Evaluation O¢ ce of the IMF, ￿the IMF had been
almost continually engaged through programs [with Argentina] since 1991￿
and ￿IMF resources were provided in support of Argentina￿ s ￿xed exchange
rate regime, which had long been stated by the IMF as both essential to price
stability and fundamentally viable.￿ (IMF, 2004):
Throughout the crises induced by external contagion, the IMF backed Ar-
gentina in two ways. First, it provided the ￿nancial aid that would prevent
a run on Argentinean ￿nancial resources. Second, it helped the Argentinean
government cope with both short-term public debt and the pressure to de-
value. Although from 1994 onwards, Argentina failed to accomplish the ￿scal
targets agreed with the IMF, this failure was systematically ignored so that
12the country could receive extra ￿nancial aid. In the 1992-2001 period, the
IMF granted loans of $22 billion. Indeed, in 2000, the IMF further approved
what in Argentina became popularly known as blindaje ￿nanciero (￿nancial
shielding), namely a loan for $40 billion, which was composed of loans from
the IMF (U.S. $14 billion), the World Bank and the IADB ($5 billion), the
government of Spain ($1 billion) and a further $20 billion that came from
the private sector. Needless to say, the crisis of 2001 was triggered despite
the e⁄orts of the IMF.
It seems natural to ask the following: why would the U.S. government
support a package of reforms that did not fully comport with the technical
recommendation of the IMF? The two recommendations (￿scal discipline
and a competitive exchange rate) of the Washington Consensus that were
neglected by Cavallo￿ s plan seem to have had a key role in the collapse of the
Argentinean economy. We can examine the consequences of these missing
components.
The U.S. government followed an o¢ cial policy of a ￿strong dollar￿at
least from 1995. Clinton￿ s Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, was perhaps
the main advocate of this U.S. policy. The bene￿ts for the U.S. from a
strong dollar are three-fold. First, it helps ￿nance the large current account
de￿cit by means of capital in￿ ows. Second, it nurtures the U.S. stock market.
Third, it reduces in￿ ationary pressure. These bene￿ts had been sought since
the administration of Ronald Reagan, even though there was, on occasion,
some concern about the undesired result of a strong dollar, namely the trade
13consequences of a less competitive exchange rate.
A convenient strategy for the U.S. government at the time Argentina
implemented its currency board would had been to attempt to appreciate the
dollar without a⁄ecting the rate of exchange relative to key U.S. commercial
partners, like Western Europe, China and Japan. In fact, this reasoning
is in line with the thoughts of Nicholas F. Brady, U.S. Treasury Secretary
during the time Argentina implemented the Convertibility Plan. As the
earlier quotation suggests, the relevant questions are (i) whether the dollar
is higher or lower with respect to other currencies and (ii) to what extent the
dollar is held as a reserve currency.
We suggest that at the beginning of the 1990￿ s there was an alignment
of interests between the Argentinean upper middle class, the politicians of
that country and the U.S. government. Several years of the Convertibility
Plan were the product of this alignment. The evolution and e⁄ect of this
alignment and its collapse can be presented brie￿ y.
By 1989 the Argentinean state was bankrupted and forced to ￿nance it-
self via a monetary laxity that produced hyperin￿ ation. In order to enrich
themselves, members of the political elite would ￿rst have to enrich the state,
and the best way to achieve this was to privatize the publicly-owned compa-
nies. However, to make the bankrupted state companies attractive enough
to foreign investors, the whole economy would require some modi￿cations,
beginning with macroeconomic stability and a strong currency.
This package of policies was bene￿cial to the Argentinean upper middle
14class. Nonetheless, given Menem￿ s party a¢ liation and personal background,
he had no chance of being elected in 1989 by targeting this class. Instead,
he targeted the working class with promises that, we suggest, he had little
intention of implementing. Once in o¢ ce, Menem needed the endorsement
of the IMF. In this respect, the sole challenge was to get the support of the
IMF for two mainstays of his plan, namely a loose ￿scal discipline (helpful
for political and electoral purposes) and a non competitive exchange rate
(required to make privatization an attractive proposition for foreign ￿rms).
The remaining policies ￿tted with the Washington Consensus, and would
therefore induce no opposition.
The currency board proposed by Cavallo happened to be in line with
the interests of the U.S. Treasury. (The opinion of Nicholas F. Brady, U.S.
Treasury Secretary at that time supports this view.) In turn, the support of
the U.S. government would facilitate the endorsement of the IMF. Thus the
Convertibility Plan could be implemented.
Five years later, Menem had the opportunity to try for the re-election.
This time, the strategy of targeting a social class di⁄erent from the one to
be bene￿ted was unnecessary. Menem￿ s platform, as described above, was
supported by a new electoral coalition that included the upper middle class
and gave him the electoral victory. After ten years and a failed attempt by
Menem to obtain a second re-election, a new President, Fernando De La Rua,
was elected in 1999. Although De La Rua belonged to the opposition (UCR),
in his electoral platform he committed himself to maintain the economic
15scheme implemented by Menem. De La Rua kept this promise once in o¢ ce.
However, the negative consequences of the Convertibility Plan were so severe
that they became impossible to ignore. The public debt was already too
high, and the economy showed serious symptoms of high unemployment,
￿scal imbalance and stagnation. The prestige of Cavallo, who had succeeded
in the ￿ght against hyperin￿ ation, was so high among the electorate that the
new administration was compelled to appoint him as Minister of the Economy
in March 2001. Despite Cavallo￿ s e⁄orts, the Argentinean economy fell into
crisis in December 2001. After the resignation of De La Rua and a chaotic
sequence of interim presidents, Nestor Kirchner, candidate of the PJ with
leftist leanings, was elected in May 2003.
The backlash to the crisis in Argentina may well be the reason there
has been a strong move toward the left, together with a spread of anti U.S.
sentiment, in many countries in Latin America.
The story that we have presented above leaves unexplained an important
political question: by what mechanism was Menem able to desert the pop-
ulists who supported him in 1989 and obtain the support of a new group of
the upper middle class voters in 1995? It is improbable that an argument
based on a median voter will su¢ ce. It is possible that Menem was close to a
median voter position on the left-right axis in 1989. However, the economic
pain caused to populist voters by the Convertibility Plan, together with the
bene￿ts for the middle class voters from the same plan, both suggest that
Menem￿ s position in 1995 was not at the median. We present a formal model
16of the election that posits that the Convertibility Plan induced a second
dimension of policy, de￿ned essentially by the hard currency position under-
lying the plan. We propose a stochastic model of the election, where the
presidential election depends on two kinds of valence. The ￿rst is exogenous
and characterizes the perceived quality of the candidates (Ansolabehere and
Snyder, 2000). The second is endogenous, and is associated with the ￿nancial
support by activists. In the model, this support provides the ￿nancial means
by which the candidate a⁄ects the perception by the voters of the candidate￿ s
quality.4. Note that a candidate might also use these resources to in￿ uence
the voters adversely about the opponent￿ s quality.
4 A Formal Model of the Election: Local Nash
Equilibrium with Activists and Vote Max-
imizing Parties
The electoral model presented here is an extension of the standard multiparty
stochastic model (McKelvey and Patty, 2006), modi￿ed by inducing asym-
metries in terms of valence. The justi￿cation for developing the model in this
way is the extensive empirical evidence that valence is a natural way to model
the judgements made by voters of party leaders (Scho￿eld and Sened, 2006).
The model focuses on local pure strategy Nash equilibria (LNE). From the
4Aldrich, 1983, Aldrich and McGinnis, 1989.
17de￿nitions of these equilibria it follows that a pure strategy Nash equiibrium
(PNE) must be a LNE, but not conversely. A necesary condition for an LNE
is thus a necesary condition for a PNE. A su¢ cient condition for an LNE is
not a su¢ cient condition for PNE. Indeed, additional conditions of concavity
or quasi-concavity are required to guarantee existence of PNE.
The key idea underlying the formal model is that party leaders (or can-
didates) attempt to estimate the electoral e⁄ects of party declarations, or
manifestos, and choose their own positions as best responses to other party
declarations, in order to maximize their own vote share. The stochastic model
essentially assumes that party leaders cannot predict vote response precisely,
but can estimate an expected vote share. In the model with valence, the
stochastic element is associated with the weight given by each voter, i, to the
average perceived quality or valence,￿ij, of the party leader.
De￿nition of the Stochastic Electoral Model with Activist Va-
lence (SEMAV)
The data of the spatial model is a distribution, fxi 2 Xgi2N, of voter ideal
points for the members of the electorate, N, of size n. We assume that X is
an open convex subset of Euclidean space, Rw, with w ￿nite. Without loss
of generality, we adopt coordinate axes so that 1
n￿xi = 0: By assumption
0 2 X; and this point is termed the electoral mean, or alternatively, the
electoral origin. Each of the parties in the set P = f1;:::;j;:::;pg chooses
a policy, zj 2 X, to declare. Let z = (z1;:::;zp) 2 Xp be a typical vector of
party policy positions.
18Given z, each voter, i, is described by a vector
ui(xi;z) = (ui1(xi;z1);:::;uip(xi;zp));where
uij(xi;zj) = ￿j + ￿j(zj) ￿ ￿jjxi ￿ zjjj
2 + ￿j = u
￿
ij(xi;zj) + ￿j: (1)
Here u￿
ij(xi;zj) is the observable component of utility for voter i. The
perception by i of the exogenous valence of party j.is given by the term
￿ij = ￿j + ￿j;where ￿j is the stochastic component of the distribution .The
function ￿j(zj) is the endogenous component of valence generated by activist
contributions to agent j: This component of the model derives from Aldrich
(1983a,b). The term ￿ is a positive constant, called the spatial parameter,
giving the importance of policy di⁄erence de￿ned in terms of a metric induced
from the Euclidean norm, jj ￿ jj; on X. The vector
￿ = (￿1;:::;￿j;::;￿p)
is the stochastic error vector, whose mutivariate cumulative distribution will
be denoted by ￿:We adopt the assumption that ￿ is the Type I extreme value
distribution (or Gumbel distribution.), where ￿ takes the closed form
￿(h) = exp[￿[exp[￿h]]:
This assumption is the standard assumption for empirical multinomial con-
19ditional logit models of elections.(See Dow and Endersby, 2004).
It is assumed that the exogenous valence vector
￿ = (￿1;￿2;::;￿p) satis￿es ￿p ￿ ￿p￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿1:
Voter behavior is modeled by a probability vector. The probability that
a voter i chooses party j at the vector z is
￿ij(z) = Pr[[uij(xi;zj) > uil(xi;zl)], for all l 6= j]: (2)




il(xi;zj), for all l 6= j]: (3)
Here Pr stands for the probability operator generated by the distribution







The di⁄erentiable function V : Xp ! Rp is called the party pro￿le func-
tion. ￿
A vector z￿ = (z￿
1;:::;z￿
p) is a strict local Nash equilibrium (LSNE)
for the pro￿le function V : Xp ! Rp i⁄ z￿





p) ￿xed. This condition is equivalent to the
condition that each, z￿
j is a critical point of Vj; and moreover, the Hessian
(or second di⁄erential ) of Vj;) at z￿
j has negative eigenvalues.
20Using the Gumbel distribution Train (2003) shows that for each voter i;










￿ij(z) = [1 + ￿k=6=j[exp(fk)]]
￿1 (6)
where fk = ￿k + ￿k(zk) ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿j(zj) + ￿jjxi ￿ zjjj
2 ￿ ￿jjxi ￿ zkjj
2:
Scho￿eld (2006) uses (5) to show that the ￿rst order condition for z￿ =(
,z￿
j; ..) to be a LSNE for the SEMAV is that it be a balance solution, where
each z￿
























￿ijxi is a convex combination of the set of voter ideal points.























The bracketed term on the left of this expression is termed the marginal
electoral pull of party j and is a gradient vector pointing towards the weighted
electoral mean of the party. This weighted electoral mean is that point where
the electoral pull is zero. The vector
d￿j
dzj is called the marginal activist pull
for party j.
If z￿satis￿es the balance equation for all j; then call z￿ the balance solu-
tion. ￿
We now consider competition betweenthe two parties, labelled 1 (Partido
Justicialista or PJ) and 2 (Union Civica Radical, or UCR), in a policy space
with w = 2; where 1 has traditionally been on the left of the economic (x)
axis, and 2 on the right of the same axis. To examine the e⁄ect of the second
dimension of policy we develop an earlier model based on "ellipsoidal" utility
functions of potential activist groups (Miller and Scho￿eld, 2003, Scho￿eld
and Miller, 2007).







for maximizing the total valence of parties 1,2 when there are four activist
groups, L, H, R, S whose preferred points are L;H;R;S say, and whose utility
22functions are uL , uH;uR;uS. The contributions of the groups L, H to party
1 are ￿L and ￿H:; and the contributions ￿R ￿S of the groups, R and S are
to party 2..In the application of the model to Agentina, L and R denote left
and right on the economic ( or x axis, while H and S stand for supporters
of a "hard" currency and "soft" currency respectively on the currency (or y)
axis. See Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We make the following set of assumptions:
Assumption on Activist Utility Functions;.
We suppose that activist group L, situated on the left of the economic
axis, with preferred point L = (xl;yl) has a utility function uL(x;y) based









Assuming that a < b means that such an activist is more concerned with
economic policy than with issues on the y axis. Say the utility function
assigns higher salence to the x ￿ axis than the y ￿ axis in the ratio b
a > 1:
We also suppose that the activist group H with preferred point H = (xh;yh)









Assuming that f < e means that such an activist is more concerned with
23"currency" policy on the y axis, than with standard left right economic issues.
Again, say the utility function assigns higher salence to the y ￿axis than to
the x￿axis in the ratio
f
e > 1:The contract curve generated by these utility










with ￿L ￿ 0;￿H ￿ 0;(￿L;￿H) 6= 0: Note that (￿L;￿H) can be interpreted as
smooth functions of z: Using this expression we can show that the ￿contact
curve￿between the point (xl;yl) and the point (xh;yh); generated by these





















f2 > 1: (16)
This "contract curve" for party 1, associated with the two activist groups,
centered at L and H, is a catenary, whose curvature is determined by the
"salience ratios" (b
a , e
f) of the utility functions of the activist groups.
We also assume that there are two activist groups, R and S, for 2, centered
at R = (xr;yr) and S = (xs;ys). As mentioned above, members of S support
a soft or weak currency, that would allow for greater exports, and fewer
24imports. In the same way we assume the utility function for R assigns higher
salence to the x￿axis than to the y￿axis in the ratio h
g > 1; while the utility
function for S assigns higher salence to the y ￿ axis than to the x ￿ axis in
the ratio r
s > 1:
Then again, the ￿contact curve￿between the point (xr;yr) and the point













Assumption on Activist Gradient Functions.
(i)The total activist valences for party 1 can be decomposed into two
components
￿1(z1) = ￿L(￿L(uL(z1))) + ￿H(￿H(uH(z1))): (19)
where ￿L;￿H are functions of the contributions ￿L;￿H, and these can be
written as functions of the utilities of the activist groups, uL(z1); uH(z1) at
z1:
Note that there is no presumption that these functions are linear.

















where the coe¢ cients ￿￿
L;￿￿
H > 0; and are di⁄erentiable functions of z:

















where again the coe¢ cients ￿￿￿
L ;￿￿￿
H > 0; and are di⁄erentiable functions
of z:￿
Under these assumptions, the ￿rst order equation
d￿1













































where ￿L;￿H >0. We can extend this locus by making the natural assump-
tion that ￿L = 0 i⁄
duS
dz = 0 and ￿H = 0 i⁄
duL
dz = 0: Then the equation
d￿1
dz = 0, with ￿L;￿H ￿0, (￿L;￿H) 6= (0;0) coincides with the contract curve
for the utility functions (uL;uH) of the activist groups.
Notice here that if the functions (￿L;￿H) are not speci￿ed, but merely
assumed to be di⁄erentiable functions of z; then the solution of (24) gives
26a smooth one-dimensional closed locus. Once the functions (￿L;￿H) are
speci￿ed, and additional concavity assumptions imposed on the functions
implicit in (24) then the solution to the equation
d￿1
dz = 0 will be a single
point.
Similarly, we assume that
￿2(z2) = ￿R(￿R(uR(z2))) + ￿S(￿S(uS(z2))); (25)
where uR(z2) and uS(z2) are the utilities of the activist groups at z2:













These assumptions are quite natural. They posit that the gradient of
each contribution function is dictated by the utility gradient of the activist
group, and this gives the direction of most rapidly increasing valence for the
relevant party..
We therefore identify the contract curves for the activist groups in sup-
port of 1 and 2 as the loci of points that satisfy the ￿rst order conditions
for maximizing ￿1 and ￿2 respectively. We therefore call the loci of points
satisfying the ￿rst order conditions the activist catenaries for 1 and 2 respec-
tively. While a position of candidate j on the jth activist catenary satis￿es
the ￿rst order condition for maximizing the total valence function, ￿j; it need
not maximize vote share,Vj. This requires considering the marginal electoral
27e⁄ect. It follows from (10) that the ￿rst order conditions are given by the

















































The coe¢ cients in these equations depend on the varous gradient coe¢ cients
introduced above. We write them explicitly as functions of z￿
j. The locus of
points satisfying the equation for party j is called the balance locus for j.
Again, if the coe¢ cients are not speci￿ed, then the balance loci for j is also
a one-dimensional smooth catenary.￿
For example, the balance locus for party 1 it is obtained by shifting the
contract curve for the activists centered at L and H towards the weighted
electoral mean of 1: Figure 1 gives an illustration of the balance loci for the
two parties.
Notice, for example, that if ￿￿
H; the willingness of the activist group, H, to
contribute to party 1, is higher than ￿￿
L, then this group will have a greater
in￿ uence on the position of 1, so that z￿
1 will be closer to H:
Obviously, maximizing vote shares by solving (27) and (28) depends on
the second order condition on the Hessian of the vote functions {Vj : :j =
1;2g:
Concavity Assumption on the Hessians of Activist Functions.
Because the utility functions of the activist groups for both 1 and 2 are
28concave in z; we can expect the contribution functions, ￿L; ￿S for 1 to be
concave in z1, and the contribution functions ￿R;￿C for 2 to be concave in
z2: Moreover, contributions can be expected to exhibit decreasing returns.
We therefore assume that the valences ￿L;￿S are concave functions of ￿L;
￿S respectively, and the valences ￿R;￿C are concave functions of ￿R; ￿C
These assumptions imply that the total activist valence functions
￿1(z1) = = ￿L(￿L(uL(z1))) + ￿H(￿H(uH(z1))) (29)
and
￿2(z2) = ￿R(￿R(z2)) + ￿S((￿S(z2)): (30)
are concave functions of z1; z2; respectively. ￿




dzj and thus on the valence functions as well as the
location of the opposition candidate, k.
We can use the condition that the Hessians of these valence functions with
respect to z1; z2 respectively, have negative eigenvalues of high modulus. This
gives a su¢ cient condition for existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
for the vote maximizing game..
The term balance solution is used for a pair of positions (z￿
1;z￿
2) satisfying







are mutual local best response functions.
Obviously we can perform the same reasoning when there are more than
29two activist groups for each candidate.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the balance solutions and weighted electoral mean for
party PJ. This ￿gure also shows the contract curve for the PJ ( between
the economic left at L and the hard currency supporters at H) The equilib-
rium position for a candidate for PJ will depend on the di⁄erence between
exogenous valences of the PJ candidate and the UCR candidate, as well as
the position adopted by the UCR candidate. We suggest that the exogenous
valence of Menem in 1995 was higher than that of the competing candidate,
Massaccesi of the UCR, because of the residual sentiments associated with
Peronism in the working class. Even though Menem￿ s move to the right on
the economic axis (as illustrated in Figure 1) lost him votes, he gained from
the increased resouces made available from the new activist group at the
hard currency position.
Support for this two dimensional model of party positioning is provided
by Figure 3, which gives an estimate of the elctoral distribution of voter
preferred positions derived from a sample survey.5
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
5The factor anaysis was based on a survey . Politics and the Presidential Election,
Romer & Associates, Survey -TOP045: Roper Center Databank.
304.1 Limitations of the Standard Model without Ac-
tivists.
To illustrate the limitation of the standard electoral model, consider the
1989 election on the assumption of a single dimensional polity. Suppose that
the exogenous valences of the candidates for the two parties are ￿PJ;￿UCR
respectively,.with ￿PJ > ￿UCR, and ignore activist valence for the moment.
Scho￿eld (2007) has shown that both parties converge to the origin if and
only if ￿ ￿ ￿0; where
￿0 ￿
[exp(￿PJ ￿ ￿UCR) + 1]
2v2[exp(￿PJ ￿ ￿UCR) ￿ 1]
: (31)
and v2 is a measure of the variance of the electoral distribution of pre-
ferred positions. If ￿ > ￿0 then the vote maximizing positions of the PJ and
UCR will lie on opposite sides of the electoral origin, with the higher valence
candidate nearer to the origin. If we add in activist valence then the candi-
dates must balance what we have termed the activist and electoral pulls. See
Figure 4 for an illustration. However, it is obvious that in one dimension,
the activist group, L, must prefer support for populist measures. It is thus
implausible that the activist in￿ uence would cause a candidate for the PJ
to adopt strategies that bene￿t the upper middle class. It is for this reason
that we have posited that Menem￿ s policy with regard to the Convertibility
Plan should be located in a two dimensional policy space, as suggested by
the electoral data in Figure 3.
31[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
5 Conclusion
While it is very common to construct one dimensional empirical and formal
models of elections, these ignore the fact that the electorate will often be con-
cerned about policies de￿ned by economic and political choices that are ex-
ternal, in some sense, to the standard policies of taxes and the labour market.
For example, a recent analysis of British elections (Scho￿eld, 2005) suggests
that the second ￿external￿ dimension concerns attitudes to the European
Union. Although the second dimension in US politics is usually considered
to be de￿ned in terms of civil rights, the election of November 7, 2006 in the
United States suggests that it was actually an external policy, namely the
situation in Iraq, that concerned voters (Scho￿eld and Miller, 2007).
We suggest that in the Latin American polities, the second electoral di-
mension is de￿ned in terms of the ￿external￿issues of the exchange rate,
debt, and the relationship with the United States. The oscillation in one
polity follows naturally from this two-dimensionality of the policy space, as
activist groups are brought into prominence as a result of the links between
choices made in the internal and external dimensions. As the Argentinean
case illustrates, the form of the support provided by both internal activists
(large companies, syndical leaders, etc.) and external activists (multilateral
organisms, US or European business interests or policy makers) may vary,
32but the ultimate goal is to contribute to the success of candidates supporting
policies favourable to the activist groups. External conditions are crucial
because they in￿ uence the responses of the various activist groups, and thus
the strategic respnses that the political candidates.
Clearly, as it is sometimes suggested, political choices in one polity, like
Argentina, may trigger a demonstration e⁄ect, or belief cascade, in other
polities of the region. We thus have a simple reason for the possibility of
￿contagion￿from one polity to another. Our model provides another, more
direct, form of contagion, rooted in the democratic process. This form of
contagion stems from external activist groups. Supporting similar policies
across polities induces a high correlation between the electoral swings of the
countries in the region. In other words, when a hegemonic power makes a
policy choice on issues such as the exchange rate, savings level, openess of
the market, etc., then it has an incentive to try to in￿ uence the policy of
foreign countries,through support for any candidate are willing to implement
the preferred policy. However, the support of activists for the hegemon can
induce counter-response by (usually leftist) activists. These changes in the
electoral equilibriia make it appear as if the domestic electoral preferences
change temporally or geographically in a chaotic fashion across the region.
Our analysis suggests that this is a chimera. What drives the electoral
swings is not a change in preferences, but a change in the distribution of
perceptions that the electorate has of the quality of candidates of left and
right. Because these perceptions result from the actions of activists who
33respond to in￿ uences from the hegemon, we see that the electoral equilibria
in Latin American polities ( and possibly in other regions),are dependent on
the electoral choices made in those hegemonic powers playing the game of
empire.
We o⁄er this model of electoral choice as a step towards the analysis of
this more general game.
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Figure 1:Argentinean Presidential Elections 1989-1995Figure 2. The Balance Locus and weighted electoral mean 
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